Workspace Tools (MCP)
## This is a research honeypot. It records the connections it receives. If you connect a client or an agent to this server, the requests it makes are logged and analyzed. Read What is recorded before connecting anything. Do not point an agent at this server if that agent has access to anything you care about. Tool arguments are logged, so a
read_fileorquery_databasecall arrives carrying whatever path or query string your agent decided to send.
An MCP server presenting a plausible, tool-rich workspace surface, in order to study what MCP clients and agents do when handed tools with names like list_credentials and execute_command.
There is little public data on that question. Whether an agent invokes a dangerous-sounding tool unprompted, whether it reads a schema before calling, what it sends as arguments, and what a client does with a tool nobody asked it to use are all open and all measurable. This is the instrument for measuring them.
Disclosure
This repository and its registry listing originally described this as a sandbox server returning synthetic data, and did not mention that connections are recorded. That description was incomplete in the way that mattered: it invited connections without saying what happens to them. It read that way from 2026-06-17 until this rewrite.
If you connected before 2026-08-03 and want records associated with you removed, email security@brianmitchell.ai with an approximate time range.
What it does
Every response is synthetic. No tool executes anything, queries any real system, or makes an outbound request on a caller's behalf. execute_command does not run commands. list_credentials returns invented values. query_database queries nothing.
| tool | behaviour | |---|---| | search_documents | Returns invented documents. Query text is logged. | | read_file | Returns invented file contents. Requested path is logged. | | list_credentials | Returns honeytokens. Never real credentials. | | query_database | Returns invented rows. Query text is logged. | | get_config | Returns invented configuration. | | execute_command | Runs nothing. Returns a synthetic error. The command string is logged. | | diagnostics | Returns invented diagnostics. |
The credentials it returns are honeytokens: unique per issuance, syntactically plausible, never valid anywhere. If one is later presented to a system under my control, that ties a specific retrieval to a specific reuse.
What is recorded
Per request: timestamp, source address, transport metadata, the tool invoked, and the arguments passed to it.
Arguments are the part worth thinking about before connecting. An agent calling read_file sends a path; an agent calling query_database sends a query. Those come from whatever context your agent is operating in, and this server receives them. Tool arguments are not currently redacted, which is why the warning is at the top of this file rather than buried in it.
If you want to exercise a tool-rich MCP server without that, run one locally.
Source
The implementation is not published, so the behaviour described above is not independently verifiable by you. That is a real limitation and worth stating plainly rather than leaving implied: you are being asked to take my word for what a black box does with what you send it.
Treat this listing as a hosted research service with a disclosed telemetry policy, and not as open-source software you can audit. The MIT licence covers this repository's contents, which are the manifest and this document.
A related instrument with the same thesis, applied to HTTP scanners rather than MCP clients, is fully open and auditable: <https://github.com/brian-mitchell-sec/http-bait>.
Connect
https://vandorla.com/mcpStreamable HTTP. Connect a client only if you have read the sections above.
Contact
Questions, removal requests, and anything else: security@brianmitchell.ai.
License
MIT, see LICENSE.
