Aikido-Security-Analysis-Platform

<p align="center"> <img src="aikido-og.png" alt="Aikido - Security analysis platform for Aiken smart contracts on Cardano" width="100%" /> </p>

<p align="center"> <a href="LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg" alt="License" /></a> <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/rust-%3E%3D1.88.0-orange.svg" alt="Rust" /> <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-1186%2B-brightgreen.svg" alt="Tests" /> <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/detectors-75-2EFFB5.svg" alt="Detectors" /> <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/crashes-0-2EFFB5.svg" alt="Crashes" /> <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/audit_coverage-85%25-2EFFB5.svg" alt="Audit Coverage" /> </p>

---

Security analysis platform for Aiken smart contracts on Cardano.

Aikido goes beyond static analysis. It combines a 75-detector suite with SMT verification, transaction simulation, compliance analysis, protocol pattern detection, and grammar-aware fuzzing to find vulnerabilities in Aiken smart contracts before they reach mainnet. Multi-lane analysis cross-correlates evidence across techniques, producing findings with source context, severity ratings, CWE/CWC classifications, and actionable remediation guidance.

Built in Rust. Fast. Zero configuration required.

---

Why Aikido

Cardano smart contracts are immutable once deployed. A vulnerability in production means lost funds with no recourse. Manual audits are expensive, slow, and bottlenecked. Aikido catches the classes of bugs that auditors find most often - double satisfaction, missing signature checks, unbounded iteration, unsafe datum handling - automatically, in seconds.

• The only security tool for Aiken - no alternatives exist in the ecosystem
• 75 detectors with CWC (Cardano Weakness Classification) and CWE mappings
• Multi-lane analysis - static detectors, compliance, SMT verification, transaction simulation, protocol detection, fuzzing
• Validated against professional audit - 85% coverage on TxPipe's Strike Finance audit findings (full comparison)
• Evidence framework - findings corroborated across multiple analysis techniques (PatternMatch -> SmtProven -> SimulationConfirmed)
• 9 output formats - terminal, JSON, SARIF, Markdown, HTML, PDF, CSV, GitLab SAST, reviewdog
• Ecosystem proven - 10+ real-world projects including SundaeSwap, Anastasia Labs, Strike Finance, and Seedelf (0 crashes)

---

Quick Start

Install

# Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install Bajuzjefe/tap/aikido

# Cargo (Rust >= 1.88.0)
cargo install --git https://github.com/Bajuzjefe/Aikido-Security-Analysis-Platform aikido-cli

# npm (wrapper)
npx aikido-aiken /path/to/project

# Docker
docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/project ghcr.io/bajuzjefe/aikido:0.3.1 /project

# From source
git clone https://github.com/Bajuzjefe/Aikido-Security-Analysis-Platform.git
cd aikido && cargo build --release

Run

aikido /path/to/your-aiken-project

Example Output

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
  AIKIDO v0.3.1  Static Analysis Report
  Project: test/simple-treasury v0.1.0
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

  [CRITICAL] (definite) double-satisfaction - Handler treasury.spend iterates
    outputs without own OutputReference - validators/treasury.ak:23

    Spend handler accesses tx.outputs but never uses __own_ref to identify
    its own input. An attacker can satisfy multiple script inputs with a
    single output, draining funds.

        22 | validator treasury {
    >   23 |   spend(
    >   24 |     datum: Option<TreasuryDatum>,
    >   25 |     redeemer: TreasuryRedeemer,

    Suggestion: Use the OutputReference parameter to correlate outputs
    to this specific input.

  ...

  1 critical, 5 high, 7 medium, 0 low, 0 info
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

---

Analysis Architecture

Aikido uses a multi-lane approach where independent analysis techniques cross-validate each other:

graph TB
    subgraph Input
        A[Aiken Project] --> B[Typed AST]
    end

    subgraph Analysis Lanes
        B --> C[Detector Suite<br/>75 detectors]
        B --> D[Compliance<br/>Securify2-style]
        B --> E[SMT Verification<br/>Cardano axioms]
        B --> F[Tx Simulation<br/>exploit generation]
        B --> G[Protocol Detection<br/>DeFi classification]
        B --> H[Fuzz Lane<br/>grammar-aware]
    end

    subgraph Evidence Correlation
        C --> I[Evidence Framework]
        D --> I
        E --> I
        F --> I
        G --> I
        H --> I
    end

    I --> J[PatternMatch]
    J --> K[PathVerified]
    K --> L[SmtProven]
    L --> M[SimulationConfirmed]
    M --> N[Corroborated]

    N --> O[Report<br/>9 output formats]

    style C fill:#2EFFB5,color:#0a0a0a
    style D fill:#2EFFB5,color:#0a0a0a
    style E fill:#2EFFB5,color:#0a0a0a
    style F fill:#2EFFB5,color:#0a0a0a
    style G fill:#2EFFB5,color:#0a0a0a
    style H fill:#2EFFB5,color:#0a0a0a
    style I fill:#111111,color:#e0e0e0
    style O fill:#111111,color:#e0e0e0

Lane Details

| Lane | What it does | |------|-------------| | Detector Suite | Cross-module interprocedural analysis, taint tracking, symbolic execution, delegation-aware suppression, transitive signal merging, datum continuity tracking | | Compliance | Securify2-style dual-pattern system: every security property has compliance (safe) and violation (unsafe) patterns. 10 security property variants | | SMT Verification | Solver-independent interface with Cardano domain axioms (value conservation, signature semantics, minting policy). Constraint solving for reachability | | Tx Simulation | ScriptContext builder generates concrete exploit scenarios. Tests 6 detector categories against simulated transactions | | Protocol Detection | Automatic DeFi protocol classification (DEX, Lending, Staking, DAO, NFT, Options, Escrow). Token flow and authority analysis | | Fuzz Lane | Grammar-aware Cardano transaction generation, Echidna-style stateful protocol fuzzing, deterministic PRNG |

Supporting modules: CWC Registry (30 entries mapping all 75 detectors), Scorecard (Experimental -> Beta -> Stable promotion with quality gates), SSA IR (phi nodes, dominators, use-def chains).

---

Real-World Validation

Strike Finance Audit Comparison

Aikido was benchmarked against TxPipe's professional audit of Strike Finance (perpetuals + forwards contracts):

| Metric | Result | |--------|--------| | TxPipe security findings analyzed | 24 | | Full match (true positive) | 12 | | Partial match | 5 | | Correctly not flagged (code fixed) | 4 | | False negatives | 3 | | Aikido unique findings | 26 | | Coverage (unfixed findings) | 85% |

Full methodology and per-finding breakdown: AUDIT_COMPARISON.md

Ecosystem Validation

Validated against 10+ real-world Aiken smart contract projects with zero crashes:

| Project | Findings | Severity Distribution | |---------|----------|-----------------------| | SundaeSwap DEX | 47 | 1 critical, 13 high, 24 medium, 3 low, 6 info | | Anastasia Design Patterns | 24 | 3 critical, 10 high, 8 medium, 2 low, 1 info | | Anastasia Multisig | 6 | 2 critical, 4 medium | | Seedelf Wallet | 4 | 1 high, 2 medium, 1 low | | Strike Finance (4 repos) | 75 | 5 critical, 18 high, 40 medium, 8 low, 4 info | | Acca | 20 | 20 medium | | Total | 176 | 81% estimated true positive rate |

---

Detectors

75 detectors mapped to CWE identifiers.

<details> <summary><strong>Critical (5)</strong></summary>

| Detector | CWE | Description | |----------|-----|-------------| | double-satisfaction | CWE-362 | Spend handler iterates outputs without referencing own input | | missing-minting-policy-check | CWE-862 | Mint handler doesn't validate which token names are minted | | missing-utxo-authentication | CWE-345 | Reference inputs used without authentication | | unrestricted-minting | CWE-862 | Minting policy with no authorization check at all | | output-address-not-validated | CWE-20 | Outputs sent to unchecked addresses |

</details>

<details> <summary><strong>High (19)</strong></summary>

| Detector | CWE | Description | |----------|-----|-------------| | missing-redeemer-validation | CWE-20 | Catch-all redeemer pattern trivially returns True | | missing-signature-check | CWE-862 | Authority datum fields with no extra_signatories check | | unsafe-datum-deconstruction | CWE-252 | Option datum not safely deconstructed with expect Some | | missing-datum-in-script-output | CWE-404 | Script output without datum attachment (funds locked forever) | | arbitrary-datum-in-output | CWE-20 | Outputs produced without validating datum correctness | | division-by-zero-risk | CWE-369 | Division with attacker-controlled denominator | | token-name-not-validated | CWE-20 | Mint policy checks auth but not token names | | value-not-preserved | CWE-682 | Spend handler doesn't verify output value >= input value | | unsafe-match-comparison | CWE-697 | Value compared with match instead of structural equality | | integer-underflow-risk | CWE-191 | Subtraction on redeemer-controlled values | | quantity-of-double-counting | CWE-682 | Token quantity checked without isolating input vs output | | state-transition-integrity | CWE-20 | Redeemer actions without datum transition validation | | withdraw-zero-trick | CWE-863 | Withdraw handler exploitable with zero-value withdrawal | | other-token-minting | CWE-862 | Mint policy allows minting tokens beyond intended scope | | unsafe-redeemer-arithmetic | CWE-682 | Arithmetic on redeemer-tainted values without bounds | | value-preservation-gap | CWE-682 | Lovelace checked but native assets not preserved | | uncoordinated-multi-validator | CWE-362 | Multi-handler validator without cross-handler coordination | | missing-burn-verification | CWE-862 | Token burning without proper verification | | oracle-manipulation-risk | CWE-20 | Oracle data used without manipulation safeguards |

</details>

<details> <summary><strong>Medium (24)</strong></summary>

| Detector | CWE | Description | |----------|-----|-------------| | missing-validity-range | CWE-613 | Time-sensitive datum without validity_range check | | insufficient-staking-control | CWE-863 | Outputs don't constrain staking credential | | unbounded-datum-size | CWE-400 | Datum fields with unbounded types (List, ByteArray) | | unbounded-value-size | CWE-400 | Outputs don't constrain native asset count | | unbounded-list-iteration | CWE-400 | Direct iteration over raw transaction list fields | | oracle-freshness-not-checked | CWE-613 | Oracle data used without recency verification | | non-exhaustive-redeemer | CWE-478 | Redeemer match doesn't cover all constructors | | hardcoded-addresses | CWE-798 | ByteArray literals matching Cardano address lengths | | utxo-contention-risk | CWE-400 | Single global UTXO contention pattern | | cheap-spam-vulnerability | CWE-770 | Validator vulnerable to cheap UTXO spam | | unsafe-partial-pattern | CWE-252 | Expect pattern on non-Option type that may fail at runtime | | unconstrained-recursion | CWE-674 | Self-recursive handler without clear termination | | empty-handler-body | CWE-561 | Handler with no meaningful logic | | unsafe-list-head | CWE-129 | list.head() / list.at() without length guard | | missing-datum-field-validation | CWE-20 | Spend handler accepts datum fields but never validates them | | missing-token-burn | CWE-862 | Minting policy with no burn handling | | missing-state-update | CWE-665 | State machine without datum update | | rounding-error-risk | CWE-682 | Integer division on financial values | | missing-input-credential-check | CWE-862 | Input iteration without credential check | | duplicate-asset-name-risk | CWE-694 | Minting without unique asset name enforcement | | fee-calculation-unchecked | CWE-682 | Fee or protocol payment without validation | | datum-tampering-risk | CWE-20 | Datum passed through without field-level validation | | missing-protocol-token | CWE-862 | State transition without protocol token verification | | unbounded-protocol-operations | CWE-400 | Both input and output lists iterated without bounds |

</details>

<details> <summary><strong>Low / Info (12)</strong></summary>

| Detector | Severity | Description | |----------|----------|-------------| | reference-script-injection | Low | Outputs don't constrain reference_script field | | unused-validator-parameter | Low | Validator parameter never referenced | | fail-only-redeemer-branch | Low | Redeemer branch that always fails | | missing-min-ada-check | Info | Script output without minimum ADA check | | dead-code-path | Low | Unreachable code paths | | redundant-check | Low | Trivially true conditions | | shadowed-variable | Info | Handler parameter shadowed by pattern binding | | magic-numbers | Info | Unexplained numeric literals | | excessive-validator-params | Info | Too many validator parameters | | unused-import | Info | Imported module with no function calls |

</details>

Each detector has detailed documentation with vulnerable examples, safe examples, and remediation guidance. Use aikido --explain <detector-name> or see docs/detectors/.

---

Output Formats

9 formats for different workflows:

aikido /path/to/project                        # Colored terminal output (default)
aikido /path/to/project --format json          # JSON (machine-readable)
aikido /path/to/project --format sarif         # SARIF v2.1.0 (GitHub Code Scanning)
aikido /path/to/project --format markdown      # Markdown report
aikido /path/to/project --format html          # Standalone HTML report
aikido /path/to/project --format pdf           # PDF audit report
aikido /path/to/project --format csv           # CSV export
aikido /path/to/project --format gitlab-sast   # GitLab SAST
aikido /path/to/project --format rdjson        # reviewdog

---

Configuration

.aikido.toml

# Use a preset as a starting point
extends = "strict"      # or "lenient" for fewer warnings

[detectors]
disable = ["magic-numbers", "unused-import"]

[detectors.severity_override]
unbounded-datum-size = "low"

# Per-file overrides
[[files]]
pattern = "tests/**"
disable = ["hardcoded-addresses", "magic-numbers"]

Inline Suppression

// aikido:ignore[double-satisfaction] -- false positive: own_ref checked in helper
spend(datum, redeemer, own_ref, tx) {
  ...
}

Baseline Support

aikido /path --accept-baseline    # Save current findings as baseline
aikido /path                      # Only new findings reported

---

CI/CD Integration

GitHub Actions

name: Security
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
  aikido:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - name: Install Aikido
        run: cargo install --git https://github.com/Bajuzjefe/Aikido-Security-Analysis-Platform aikido-cli
      - name: Run analysis
        run: aikido . --format sarif --fail-on high > results.sarif
      - name: Upload SARIF
        if: always()
        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
        with:
          sarif_file: results.sarif

Docker

docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/project ghcr.io/bajuzjefe/aikido:0.3.1 /project --format json

---

CLI Reference

aikido /path                        # Analyze project
aikido /path --fail-on high         # Exit non-zero for high+ findings
aikido /path --min-severity medium  # Filter to medium+ only
aikido /path --verbose              # Include UPLC metrics and budget
aikido /path --list-rules           # Show all detectors
aikido /path --explain <rule>       # Detailed explanation with examples
aikido /path --diff main            # Only report findings in changed files
aikido /path --watch                # Re-run on file changes
aikido /path -q                     # Quiet mode
aikido /path --config my.toml       # Use specific config file
aikido /path --accept-baseline      # Save current findings as baseline
aikido /path --lsp                  # LSP JSON-RPC diagnostics
aikido /path --interactive          # Terminal navigator for findings
aikido /path --fix                  # Insert suppression comments
aikido /path --generate-config      # Generate .aikido.toml from findings
aikido /path --strict-stdlib        # Reject stdlib v1.x (default: warn)
aikido --git <url>                  # Clone and analyze remote repo
aikido --benchmark-manifest benchmarks/local-fixtures.toml --format json
aikido --benchmark-manifest benchmarks/local-fixtures.toml --benchmark-enforce-gates

---

Architecture

aikido/
├── crates/
│   ├── aikido-core/           # Library: analysis engine
│   │   ├── src/
│   │   │   ├── project.rs            # Aiken project loading & compilation
│   │   │   ├── ast_walker.rs         # Typed AST traversal -> ModuleInfo
│   │   │   ├── body_analysis.rs      # Handler body signal extraction + taint tracking
│   │   │   ├── call_graph.rs         # Function dependency graph
│   │   │   ├── cross_module.rs       # Cross-module interprocedural analysis
│   │   │   ├── symbolic.rs           # Symbolic execution & constraints
│   │   │   ├── delegation.rs         # Delegation-aware suppression
│   │   │   ├── evidence.rs           # 5-level evidence framework
│   │   │   ├── cwc.rs               # Cardano Weakness Classification registry
│   │   │   ├── scorecard.rs          # Detector quality tracking & promotion
│   │   │   ├── ssa.rs               # SSA IR with phi nodes & use-def chains
│   │   │   ├── compliance.rs         # Securify2-style compliance analysis
│   │   │   ├── smt.rs               # SMT verification with Cardano axioms
│   │   │   ├── path_analysis.rs      # Path-sensitive analysis & CFG
│   │   │   ├── invariant_spec.rs     # .aikido-invariants.toml DSL
│   │   │   ├── protocol_patterns.rs  # DeFi protocol detection & classification
│   │   │   ├── tx_simulation.rs      # ScriptContext builder & exploit generation
│   │   │   ├── fuzz_lane.rs          # Grammar-aware tx fuzzing
│   │   │   ├── config.rs             # .aikido.toml configuration
│   │   │   ├── suppression.rs        # Inline suppression comments
│   │   │   ├── baseline.rs           # Baseline file support
│   │   │   ├── uplc_analysis.rs      # UPLC bytecode analysis & budgets
│   │   │   └── detector/             # 75 detector implementations
│   │   └── tests/                    # 1186+ tests
│   └── aikido-cli/            # Binary: clap-based CLI
├── fixtures/                  # Test contracts (7 fixtures)
├── audits/                    # Audit comparison artifacts
├── docs/detectors/            # Per-detector documentation
├── .github/workflows/         # CI, cross-platform, release, fuzz
├── homebrew/                  # Homebrew formula
├── npm/                       # npm wrapper package
├── vscode-extension/          # VS Code extension
├── fuzz/                      # cargo-fuzz targets
└── Dockerfile                 # Multi-stage build

Building from Source

git clone https://github.com/Bajuzjefe/Aikido-Security-Analysis-Platform.git
cd aikido
cargo build --release          # Binary at target/release/aikido
cargo test                     # Run test suite (1186+ tests)
cargo clippy --all-targets     # Lint (zero warnings)

Requires Rust >= 1.88.0.

---

Vulnerability Coverage

Detectors are derived from real vulnerabilities found in published Cardano smart contract audits:

| Source | Findings Covered | |--------|-----------------| | MLabs audit reports | Double satisfaction, missing minting policy, arbitrary datum, unbounded size | | Vacuumlabs audit reports | Unbounded value size, token dust attacks | | Plutonomicon | Unrestricted minting, double satisfaction patterns | | Anastasia Labs audit reports | Staking credential theft, datum handling | | TxPipe audit reports | Oracle manipulation, state transition integrity, value preservation | | CWE Database | 75 detectors mapped to specific CWE identifiers |

---

License

MIT

<!-- Current detector count: 75 -->