envcloak

envcloak

A tiny MCP server that lets a Claude Code agent read and edit .env files

without ever seeing real secret values — while keeping the file informative enough to actually debug with.

• Zero dependencies. Pure Python 3.8+ standard library. No pip, no npm.
• Self-contained. Everything lives in this one folder.
• Installable as a Claude Code plugin. One command registers the MCP server

and the .env-blocking hook — see Install.

• Tested. python3 -m unittest (54 tests).

How it works

When the agent reads a file it gets a blurred, length-preserving view:

NODE_ENV=production
API_KEY=xx_xxxx_0xX00XxXxxXXxxxxX0xxx0xx
DATABASE_URL=xxxxxxxx://xxxxx:x0xx0x@xx:0000/xxx
PORT=8080

The masking rules:

| Input | Output | Why | |------------------|------------|------------------------------------------------| | Latin letter | x / X | hides content, keeps case & length | | digit | 0 | hides content, keeps length | | punctuation/space| unchanged | keeps structure (://, @, ., -, quotes) | | non-ASCII | x | so unicode can't leak |

So a secret keeps its shape (a JWT still looks like xxx.xxx.xxx, a URL keeps its scheme/host/port skeleton) but not its value. Crucially the blurred text is the exact same length as the real file, character for character — that is what makes char-range edits safe.

Non-secret config is shown in clear via an allow-list, because that is what you need when debugging: NODE_ENV, *_ENV, LOG_LEVEL, DEBUG, PORT,

*_PORT, TZ, LANG, plus any boolean value (true/false/yes/no/on/off) and empty values. Edit the list in config.json.

Safety properties

• No round-trip corruption. The agent never needs to know a secret to edit

one. env_set_value refuses to write a value that looks like a mask (only

x/X/0 + punctuation), so a masked value can't be echoed back over a real one. Renames touch only the key.

• Structural-only range edits. env_replace_range refuses to overlap any

masked value (use env_set_value/env_rename_key for those).

• Path fence. Only env-looking files (.env, .env, .env.) are

accepted. Extend via allowed_path_globs in config.json.

• Atomic writes preserving the original file mode.
• File-level destructive ops require confirm: true (env_delete_file,

overwriting via env_create_file).

To make this airtight, the agent must not be able to read env files any other way (Read tool, cat, grep, …). The plugin does this for you — see Install:

1. A PreToolUse hook (block-env-files.py) — the enforcer. It blocks raw .env access (Read/Edit/Write/Grep/Glob/Bash, including cat/grep/wildcards/exfiltration) across every project in every permission mode. 2. An allow rule for the envcloak MCP tools baked into ~/.claude/settings.json at SessionStart, so the secure env_read path never prompts.

> Why no permissions.deny rules? Earlier versions (≤1.0.2) also baked > Read(.env.) deny rules. That breaks Claude Code's auto mode: its safety > classifier sees env_read reading a .env while a deny rule exists and rejects > it as "circumventing the deny rule by switching tools."* An allow rule can't > override the classifier. So as of 1.1.0 the plugin injects no .env deny > rules and, at SessionStart, retracts any it wrote before. Raw-read blocking > is the hook's job; the deny rules were redundant with it anyway.

Tools

| Tool | Purpose | |---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------| | env_read | Blurred view + per-key summary (masked vs clear) | | env_set_value | Set an existing key's value (round-trip guarded) | | env_rename_key | Rename a var; value preserved untouched | | env_add_key | Add a new key | | env_delete_key | Delete a key | | env_replace_range | Advanced structural splice by blurred-view offsets | | env_create_file | Create a new env file (confirm to overwrite) | | env_delete_file | Delete a file (confirm required) |

Install as a Claude Code plugin (recommended)

envcloak ships as a self-contained plugin: installing it registers the

envcloak MCP server and wires the .env-blocking hook for you — no manual settings.json editing. The repo is its own marketplace, so:

# In Claude Code:
/plugin marketplace add YushkoVolodymyr/envcloak
/plugin install envcloak@envcloak

Then restart Claude Code (or run /hooks). Verify with:

claude mcp list        # -> envcloak: ... ✔ Connected

Requirement: a Python 3.8+ interpreter on PATH. The MCP server and hooks launch as ${ENVCLOAK_PYTHON:-python3}, and a SessionStart hook auto-detects the right interpreter so you usually don't have to: it probes python3, python,

python3.x and the Windows py -3 launcher, runs each candidate to confirm it actually works (this skips the Microsoft Store python3 alias, which resolves on PATH but exits without running), then bakes the winner's absolute path into ~/.claude/settings.json → env.ENVCLOAK_PYTHON. Restart Claude Code once after first install so the server and hook pick it up.

The detector is tools/resolve-python.sh (one POSIX-shell hook entry covering Linux, macOS, and Windows under Git Bash / MSYS2). On native Windows with no POSIX shell, run the PowerShell equivalent once, then restart:

powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File tools\resolve-python.ps1

You can always override detection by setting ENVCLOAK_PYTHON yourself (it takes priority):

export ENVCLOAK_PYTHON=python     # macOS/Linux with only `python`
setx ENVCLOAK_PYTHON py           # Windows, py launcher (then restart)

Zero Python dependencies.

What the plugin activates (in every project, while enabled):

• a SessionStart hook that (a) auto-detects a working Python interpreter

and bakes it into ~/.claude/settings.json (see the requirement note above), (b) merges .env permissions.deny rules + an mcp__envcloak allow rule into the same file, and (c) injects a one-line reminder into the session so the agent reaches for env_read first;

• the envcloak MCP server (the env_read / env_set_value / … tools);
• a PreToolUse hook that blocks raw .env access via

Read/Edit/Write/Grep/Glob/Bash. The Bash gate covers bash,

cmd.exe and PowerShell — it blocks reads (including wildcards like .e* that the shell would expand to a real .env) and blocks copy/move/rename commands that would land a protected file under a readable name (secret exfiltration). Renaming/moving between protected names is allowed (e.g. mv .env.local .env).

Example/template files (.env.example, .env.sample, .env.template,

.env.dist, .env.schema) carry no secrets and stay readable.

Disable or remove anytime with /plugin (or /plugin uninstall envcloak@envcloak).

Permission rules (automatic)

The SessionStart hook reconciles ~/.claude/settings.json for you — no manual editing, idempotent, and it preserves your unrelated rules:

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__plugin_envcloak_envcloak", "mcp__plugin_envcloak_envcloak__env_read", "…",
      "mcp__envcloak", "mcp__envcloak__env_read", "…"
    ]
  }
}

The allow list covers the secure tools under both name shapes Claude Code might use: the plugin-namespaced mcp__plugin_envcloak_envcloak__<tool> (what a plugin install actually invokes) and the plain mcp__envcloak__<tool> (a non-plugin claude mcp add install) — server-wide and per-tool for each. The per-tool, correctly-namespaced entries are what auto mode matches; that mode auto-denies any tool not matched by name in permissions.allow, so a wrong or missing name means the secure env_read is rejected there.

No .env deny rules. The hook does not add permissions.deny entries, and at SessionStart it retracts any envcloak wrote in ≤1.0.2 (Read/Edit/Write on

.env, .env., the old */ variants, and config-derived globs). They broke

auto mode (the classifier flagged env_read as deny-rule circumvention) and were redundant with the always-on PreToolUse hook.

If you run in a strict, non-auto setup and want belt-and-suspenders settings denies, add them by hand — but expect auto mode to then reject env_read.

Configure

config.json:

{
  "reveal_keys": ["NODE_ENV", "*_ENV", "LOG_LEVEL", "DEBUG", "PORT", "*_PORT"],
  "reveal_boolean_values": true,
  "reveal_numeric_values": false,
  "partial_reveal": 0,
  "allowed_path_globs": []
}

• reveal_keys — glob patterns (case-insensitive) shown in clear.
• reveal_numeric_values — reveal plain numbers (off by default: a long digit

run can be a secret).

• partial_reveal — keep N real chars at each end of a masked value

(dashboard-style "ends in a3f2"). 0 = fully masked. Leaks a few bytes when set.

• allowed_path_globs — extra path/basename globs beyond *.env that the MCP

will touch (a custom env-file location). Note: the PreToolUse hook protects

.env/.env.* by basename; extend the hook separately if your custom files don't match that. Changes apply on the next /plugin reload + restart.

Develop / test

python3 -m unittest -v          # run the 54 tests

envcloak_core.py is pure logic (parse / blur / edit) and has no I/O, so it is trivially testable. server.py is the thin MCP/JSON-RPC stdio wrapper.

Known limitations

• Length is preserved, which leaks the length of a secret (fine for almost all

threat models; turn values into fixed-width if that matters to you).

• The dotenv parser handles comments, export , single/double quotes, inline

comments, and multiline quoted values — but not every exotic shell-expansion edge case. ${VAR} interpolation is masked as ordinary text.